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1. Introduction 
In the absence of complete contracting, economists realized that pledging collateral such 
as owned real estate can allow firms to borrow more, and thus, to invest more (Barro, 1976; 
Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Hart and Moore, 1994). Macroeconomists recognized the implication 
this had for amplifying the business cycle via a collateral channel effect (Bernanke and Gertler, 
1987; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). Falling asset values reduce the debt capacity of credit 
constrained firms, which depresses their investment on the downside of the cycle. An analogous 
impact occurs on the upside of the cycle when collateral values are increasing for these firms. 
Research on the United States and Japan supports this theory and has shown that rises 
and declines in property values substantially amplify the volatility of investment by non-real 
estate firms (Chaney, et. al., 2012; Cvijanovic, 2014; Gan, 2007a, 2007b; Liu, Wang and Zha, 
2013). For example, Chaney, et. al. (2012) report that a one standard deviation increase in 
underlying real estate collateral value is associated with over one-quarter of a standard deviation 
higher level of corporate investment. This implies about six cents added investment for every 
dollar increase in collateral value. Earlier research by Bernanke (1983) concludes that this factor 
helps account for the extraordinarily large variation in output during America’s Great 
Depression. 
The remarkable boom and recent cresting of China’s housing and land markets raise the 
question of whether the amplitude of its economic cycle has been magnified by a collateral 
channel effect on investment. China is an increasingly important factor in the global economy, so 
the answer to this question is important. Two new data sources are combined to provide the first 
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estimate of the impact of changing real estate collateral values on the investment behavior of 
Chinese firms outside the real estate sector. One is a constant quality land price series in 35 
major Chinese cities; the other measures real estate collateral value for publicly-traded firms 
outside the property sector in China. 
In stark contrast to the recent findings referenced above for America and Japan, we find 
no evidence of a collateral channel effect among non-real estate firms’ borrowing and investment 
behavior in China. This conclusion is robust to a wide range of permutations. For example, there 
is no evidence of asymmetry in the collateral channel effect depending upon whether housing 
and land markets are rising or falling. We also do not see heterogeneity in impact by measures of 
likely financial constraint. For example, there is no difference in our baseline results depending 
upon whether the firm is a low versus high dividend payer. Nor is there any meaningful effect (or 
difference in impact) depending upon whether or not the firm is a state-owned enterprise (SOE). 
We can also rule out the possibility that our results might be driven by financially constrained 
firms tending to be located in markets without good investment opportunities (so that they 
rationally would not want to invest even if collateral value increased substantially to lessen the 
degree to which they are constrained). Actual growth rates of local GDP were high in absolute 
terms among the slowest growing of our 35 markets during our sample period, so it seems likely 
that there are profitable investment opportunities in those places. And, there is no evidence of a 
positive collateral channel effect among firms headquartered in the markets with the strongest 
growth trends. 
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While these are noteworthy finding in their own right, we also show that the analysis 
provides insight into the nature of China’s financial markets more broadly. A well-known 
theoretical literature tells us that collateral channel effects would not be expected if no firms 
were credit constrained or if there was ‘contract completeness’ in the financial markets (Barro, 
1976; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Hart and Moore, 1994). There is reason to believe that an 
important type of company in China, the state-owned enterprise (SOE), is not financially 
constrained because of its special access to government-controlled bank funding (Allen, Qian 
and Qian, 2005; Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2010). Thus, SOEs have no need to 
rely on collateral value to fund their investment programs. In contrast, private firms (which we 
call non-SOEs) are highly likely to be constrained. In an environment with incomplete 
contracting so that credible commitments to repay debt could not be made, we would expect 
pledging collateral to ease financial constraints and make investment more plentiful (on the 
upside of a cycle). 
That we find no evidence of a collateral channel effect for either group of firms raises the 
question of whether Chinese capital markets are fundamentally different in the sense that private 
firms can credibly commit to repay. Further empirical analysis of variation in collateral channel 
effects among financially-constrained non-SOEs supports this hypothesis. For example, we look 
at how estimated impacts differ by whether the local lending market is dominated by the four 
biggest lenders, each of which is itself a state-owned commercial bank.1 The underlying 
                                                 
1 These firms are Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), China Construction Bank (CCB), Agricultural 
Bank of China (ABC) and Bank of China (BOC). Together, they accounted for just over 42% of the bank loan 
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hypothesis is that non-SOE firms can credibly commit to repay their lenders because the costs of 
defaulting on what is effectively an arm of the government in a state dominated by a single party 
are prohibitively high. Concomitantly, a given borrower is less able to credibly commit to repay 
if the lender is not one of the dominant SOE banks. We find evidence of collateral channel 
effects for private firms the lower the share of the ‘big four’ SOE lenders in the borrower’s home 
market. A similar pattern is found in additional analysis using a variable that measures the 
transparency of the local market’s business law environment. The stronger a city’s underlying 
legal system’s protections against unilateral government sanctions again non-party actors, the 
more we see a collateral channel effect among non-SOE borrowers. 
In sum, financially constrained firms do exist in China among the group of non-state-
owned enterprises. However, there is no evidence of ‘contract incompleteness’ in markets 
dominated by the big four SOE lenders or in markets with weaker legal systems that do not 
protect entities from government whim. In these cases, the frictions that give rise to collateral 
channel effects in other countries are absent in China, which is consistent with the claims of 
Allen, Qian and Qian (2005). We would not expect meaningful collateral channel effects to 
occur unless, and until, China develops a more effective and independent legal system that can 
protect defaulting borrowers from unilateral sanctions by powerful state-supported creditors.  
Before getting to that analysis, the next section describes the unique real estate and firm 
data we bring to bear in our estimation of the collateral channel effect. Section 3 then discusses 
                                                 
market in China in 2012. See Deng, Morck, Wu and Yeung (2014) for more institutional detail about these four 
dominant state-owned banks.  
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our estimation strategy and reports initial results. Section 4 delves more deeply into the nature of 
Chinese financial markets with its analysis of non-SOEs. There is a brief conclusion. 
 
2. Data on Land Values and Listed Firms 
We bring two new data sources to bear on the question of whether there is a collateral 
channel effect on Chinese firm investment. Both are unique to the study of the Chinese economy. 
The first is a panel on land prices across 35 Chinese cities; the second is a panel on firms not 
directly involved in the real estate industry.  
 
2.1. Land Value Data 
 Our land price series is based on sales of raw land by local governments, and is described 
more fully in Deng, Gyourko and Wu (2012). While raw land sales are rarely observed in most 
countries, this is not the case in China. Local governments own all the urban land in the country 
and allow private parties to purchase use rights of up to 70 years for residential purposes (i.e., 
technically, this is a leasehold estate).2 We treat the upfront lump sum payment as the 
transactions price for raw land because there are no further rental payments required.  
                                                 
2 Not only does Chinese law facilitate the use of such leasehold estates in urban areas as collateral for borrowing, but 
the data confirm that they can and will be transferred to the lender if the borrower defaults. For example, 14 of the 
16 commercial banks listed on the Shanghai or Shenzhen exchanges regularly report the value and breakdown of 
repossessed assets seized because of defaulted loans. At the end of 2011, the total book value of their repossessed 
assets was 10.79 billion yuan RMB, of which the leasehold estates associated with properties accounted for 8.79 
billion yuan RMB (or 81.4%). The remainder was comprised of plant and equipment, securities, etc.  
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Our data series begins in 2003 because of an important 2002 ruling by the Ministry of 
Land and Resources that required local governments to sell land via public auction and to 
publicly report the winning bidder along with the transactions price. This marks an important 
break with past practice that has been criticized as open to corruption (Cai, Henderson and 
Zhang, 2013), which muddies the interpretation of price data before this change. We also 
typically observe the land parcel’s precise address, designated usage, land conditions upon 
delivery, and certain planning indicators such as the floor-to-area ratio. 
 Building upon prior research on the city of Beijing in Wu, Gyourko and Deng (2012), we 
worked with a leading residential real estate data vendor in China (Soufun) to collect information 
on all residential usage land sales to private parties from 2003-2011 in the 35 major markets 
mapped in Figure 1. The geographic breadth of our sample is noteworthy. We are not limited to a 
few coastal-region markets that the media typically report to have the biggest booms. Table 1 
reports summary statistics on the sample. We have complete data dated since 2003 for 15 
markets, with the rest entering the sample in subsequent years. The number of transactions per 
market ranges from 25-50 depending upon the year.  
Land parcels in China are priced in terms of the floor area of housing permitted to be 
built on the parcel, instead of in terms of the land area. For each parcel, its real price in constant 
2009 yuan per square meter of permitted space is computed by deflating with the relevant 
monthly CPI series for each city.  We do not work with these unadjusted transactions prices 
because they may be driven by quality changes over time. Hence, we follow Wu, Gyourko and 
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Deng (2012) in creating constant quality land price indexes for each market.3 Table 2 and Table 
3 (both from Wu, Gyourko and Deng, 2012) report summary statistics on average annual land 
price growth over time and real compound average constant quality price appreciation rates for 
each city, respectively. These data show that there clearly was a boom in land prices in most 
cities in China, although it is incorrect to claim that there is a single national land market, as 
there is substantial variation in land price appreciation across and within cities over time. Other 
data from Deng, Gyourko and Wu (2012) not reported here for space reasons highlights that land 
values are much more volatile than house prices and other factors of production in housing. 
Standard deviations in land prices typically are in the 20%-40% range, which is about four times 
that of house prices, construction sector wages or physical construction costs. This is consistent 
                                                 
3 City-level hedonic models are estimated via ordinary least squares (OLS), with the log of the real transactions price 
in constant 2009 yuan as the dependent variable. Quality controls on the right-hand side include: (a) the parcel’s 
distance to the center of the corresponding city, which is measured after mapping the precise location of each site 
with GIS software; (b) the distance to the nearest subway station; this variable is relevant in 10 of the 35 cities with 
operating subway systems during our sample period; (c) district dummies which control for local/neighborhood-
level fixed effects not captured by the two previous location controls; (d) a set of physical attributes including the 
size of the parcel (in land area), the density permitted on the site when built, and whether the parcel is leveled on 
delivery; (e) in some cases, a small portion of a residential land parcel is designated for affiliated commercial 
properties, public establishments, or public housing units; we control for such conditions via a set of dummies; (f) 
the parcel’s transaction form as reflected in whether it was purchased via sealed bidding, regular English auction, or 
two-stage auction; and (g) year dummies, whose coefficients are used to create the constant quality price index. We 
also conducted a two-stage Heckman estimation to control for potential bias arising from the fact that there were a 
total of 614 parcels listed that failed to result in transactions (either because there were no bidders if there was an 
auction or the bid prices were lower than the local governments’ reserve prices, which is relevant for cases involving 
sealed bids). If these failures were disproportionately concentrated in certain periods such as the financial crisis, 
selection bias would result in an overestimation of the price index for that period. That said, we could not find any 
statistically significant impact for the inverse Mills ratio estimated from our first-stage probit model. Finally, 
correcting for quality changes over time is statistically and economically important. Average annual appreciation in 
our hedonic price series is about five percentage points higher than in the unadjusted prices series, which indicates 
that parcel quality has been falling over time on average. The declining quality of location with more sites being in 
outlying areas as Chinese cities have rapidly urbanized is an important factor, but this varies by time and market. 
See Deng, Gyourko and Wu (2012) for more detail. All underlying results are available upon request. 
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with standard real estate models, as theory predicts the residual claimant on property value (i.e., 
land) should be much more volatile.  
Twenty-seven of the 35 markets have experienced real average annual growth rates in 
constant quality land prices of above ten percent for the length of their sample periods. Nine 
have experienced average compound annual growth rates above 20%. Naturally, this implies 
large increases in real estate values, as a 10% compound annual average rate of price 
appreciation implies more than a doubling in real value between 2003 and 2011 (i.e., 1.18=2.14); 
analogously, a 20% compound annual rate implies that prices were over three times greater at the 
end of 2011 than at the beginning in 2003 (i.e., 1.28=4.30). Thus, there is no doubt that constant 
quality land prices are higher now in virtually every market than they were in 2003. Hence, if 
Chinese firms are financially constrained and collateral value is important in obtaining the 
desired amount of debt, there has been a huge increase in those values over time on average, with 
economically large variation across markets.4  
We believe these data are far superior to any alternative, the most prominent of which are 
two government-provided series on house prices. One is called the Average Selling Price of 
Newly-Built Residential Units. This reports the simple average of transactions prices as 
measured by total sales values divided by the total amount of housing square footage in the units. 
                                                 
4 We use residential land prices because it is not yet feasible to create an analogous index for commercial properties. 
Theory suggests these two series should be highly correlated, since land is substitutable between these two uses on 
the margin. As a robustness check, we calculated the correlation coefficient between the average transaction prices 
of newly-built residential buildings and commercial properties as reported by the National Bureau of Statistics of 
China in our 35 city sample. It was a strongly positive 0.64. Chaney, et. al. (2012) report similar findings in their 
robustness checks using U.S. data. 
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This series makes no attempt to control for quality differences across markets or drift over time. 
As Wu, Deng and Liu (2014) show, not effectively controlling for quality leads to substantial 
biases. The other government-provided house price series, officially termed “Price Indices in 70 
Large and Medium-Sized Cities”, is a measure of the change in average prices on unit sales 
within individual housing complexes over time. More specifically, this index is calculated by 
first computing the average sales price of new units each month in each distinct housing 
complex. The series reported by the government then is the transactions-volume weighted 
average of each complex’s average price changes over time. As Deng, Gyourko and Wu (2012) 
show, this series has very little variation over time in most markets, including the big coastal 
region cities that are thought to have had the biggest booms. That makes this data source highly 
suspect on its face, and Wu, Deng and Liu (2014) explain why it produces downwardly biased 
estimates of price growth, with much lower price volatility than exists in reality. 
  
2.2. Firm Data 
 We next collected data on publicly-traded firms listed on the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock 
exchanges. There are 1,291 firms listed during or before 2003 on these two exchanges. We get to 
our final sample size of 444 firms as follows. First, we exclude firms delisted during or before 
2011. We also drop those with measured negative equity and those involved in a major takeover 
operation during the sample period, as we suspect either data error or some other aspect of firm 
strategy is likely to complicate any potential relationship between real estate collateral value and 
investment and other spending behavior. Next, firms operating in the industries of “finance”, 
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“real estate”, and “construction” are dropped because it seems likely that the relationship 
between firm investment behavior and real estate price fluctuations may be determined by a 
mechanism other than the collateral channel effect in these business sectors. Firms in the 
industries of “agriculture”, “mining”, “production and supply of electricity, gas and water” and 
“transportation and storage” also are excluded because they tend to own properties outside of 
urban areas, and we cannot impute property value price changes outside of the 35 major markets 
listed above. Thus, our final sample is restricted to firms in the industries of “manufacturing”, 
“information technology”, “wholesale and retail”, “social service”, and “media and culture”. 
According to the official industry codes issued by the China Security Regulatory Commission, 
there are also a few firms defined as in “multiple industries”. These companies are grouped 
based on their largest sales sector. We also restrict our focus to firms with headquarters in 35 
major cities for which we have a reliable land price series that is used to impute the value of real 
estate collateral over time. This leaves us with a balanced panel of 444 firms with 3,996 firm-
year observations during 2003-2011. 
 Determining the market value of these firms’ real estate asset holdings obviously is a 
critical task for our estimation. The nature of Chinese accounting and reporting practices is such 
that three major categories of assets on the balance sheet are involved in constructing our 
measure. One is “Buildings” (a sub-entry of “Fixed Assets”, the equivalent of “Property, Plant 
and Equipment” in China’s accounting codes); a second is “Land Ownership” (a sub-entry of 
“Intangible Assets”); and the third is “Investment Properties”. Table 4 provides more detail on 
related accounting codes, including a minor adjustment in 2007. Unfortunately, none of the 
12 
 
available listed firm electronic databases in China presently provides full information on all three 
categories of property assets. Consequently, we manually collected this information from the 
original version of the firms’ annual financial reports.  
 While we believe this is the first systematic collection of non-real estate firms’ property 
holdings, this is only the starting point for our analysis. As with the Compustat data on U.S. 
corporations, Chinese company financial reports include values based on historic cost, not 
current market values. We follow the procedures adopted by Chaney, et. al. (2012) to translate 
these book values into market values. From the financial reports, we know both the original book 
value and the current book value after depreciation. Then, following certain rules on 
depreciation, the average age of properties can be computed.5 Finally, the book value is updated 
to the market value using the city-level residential land price index described above after 2003, a 
constant quality newly-built house price index between 2000 and 2002 (Wu, Deng and Liu, 
2014), and the city-level CPI index before 2000. Because we do not know the exact address of 
each property in a firm’s portfolio, we follow Chaney, et. al. (2012) and Cvijanovic (2014) in 
presuming that a firm’s properties are concentrated in the city of its headquarters.6 
                                                 
5 We use the following strategy to guide us in these calculations. If a firm explicitly describes its depreciation 
method in the appendix of its financial reports, we adopt that specific rule for that firm. Otherwise, we follow 
conventional rules on depreciation for China, which reflect an average of the different rules published by the listed 
firms in our sample: for the items of “Building” and “Investment Properties”, it is assumed that the properties are 
straight-line depreciated with 25 years of depreciable life and 5% remains; for “Land Ownership”, the corresponding 
assumption is straight-line depreciation method, 40 years of depreciable life, and 0 remains. Western readers may be 
surprised by the depreciation of land, but it does make sense because this technically is a leasehold estate position. 
6 Both Chaney, et. al. (2012) and Cvijanovic (2014) investigate the robustness of this assumption using added 
information from firm 10-K filings. Unfortunately, similar documents and data are not available in China. We 
addressed the robustness of this assumption as follows. First, we pared down the sample to firms headquartered in 
the 32 cities outside of the three national financial centers of Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen on the presumption 
that firms located in the other 32 cities are less likely to be geographically dispersed in their business and, hence, in 
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 We next develop an estimate of annual change in the value of firms’ real estate asset 
holdings. Our preferred measure is one that reflects changes in the market value over time of real 
estate assets owned by the firm in the reference year of 2002 at the very beginning of our sample 
period. Chaney, et. al. (2012) and Cvijanovic (2014) both do something similar to guard against 
bias arising from the potentially endogenous decisions of firms to alter real estate holdings in 
response to (or in conjunction with) market price changes. Thus, our collateral value measure is 
defined as: 
𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂_𝑅𝐸𝑉1𝑖,𝑡 = [𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,2002 × ∏ (1 + 𝐿𝑃𝐺𝑐,𝑗)
𝑡−1
𝑗=2003
× 𝐿𝑃𝐺𝑐,𝑡]/𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 
where REVi,2002 is the market value of real estate assets owned by firm i at the end of 2002 
computed based on the procedures described above, LPGc,j is the annual growth rate in the local 
land price index for firm i’s headquarters city c in year j, and ASSETi,t-1 is the total assets of firm 
i at the beginning of year t (i.e., at the end of the previous year).  
As part of our robustness checks described more fully below, we also used a second 
proxy, which measures the market value change in real estate assets held by the firm at the 
beginning of each year: 
𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂_𝑅𝐸𝑉2𝑖,𝑡 = [𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 × 𝐿𝑃𝐺𝑐,𝑡]/𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 
where REVi,t-1 is the market value of real estate assets owned by firm i at the beginning of year t 
(i.e., at the end of the previous year). We experiment with both measures because it is not 
                                                 
their real estate asset holdings. All our key results reported below still hold in this “geographically concentrated” 
group. 
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obvious a priori what the optimal balance is between potential endogeneity bias and 
measurement error.  
In addition to our measures of changes in underlying real estate collateral, we also use a 
number of variables describing other firm characteristics when estimating collateral channel 
effects. These are from Wind Info (www.wind.com.cn), which is a supplier of ‘Compustat-type’ 
data on Chinese companies. These include the ratio of net investment on fixed assets (property, 
plant and equipment) to firm asset value (RATIO_INV), where the numerator is defined as 
expenditures on fixed assets less cash inflows from disposing of existing fixed assets over the 
year and the denominator reflects total assets at the beginning of the relevant year (ASSET), the 
ratio of the net change in firm debt to firm asset value (RATIO_LOAN), RATIO_EBITDA, which 
reflects earnings before interest tax, depreciation and amortization (again scaled by firm assets), 
the market-to-book ratio (MBR), and leverage level at the beginning of the year (LEVERAGE, 
defined as total debt on the balance sheet divided by asset value).  
Table 5 reports the summary statistics on the variables, with each having been winsorized 
at the 5th percentile to eliminate extreme outliers in the data series. Winsorizing at different 
cutoff points (including not dropping outliers) does not materially change the results. One 
noteworthy feature is the large magnitude of the annual market value change of the listed firms’ 
real estate assets. On average, it is equivalent to about 6% of a firm’s total assets if we only take 
properties owned in the reference year into account, and is about 7.5% if all real estate assets are 
included. The fact that the average value of RATIO_REV2 is larger than RATIO_REV1 implies 
that the listed firms generally are expanding their real estate holdings over our sample period.  
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It also is the case that these firms have ample amounts of secured and unsecured debts, 
with the share of secured loans being higher. For example, from 2007-2011 the average annual 
share of their long-term debt that is secured is about 78%. The analogous figure for short-term 
debt (<1 year) is about 65%.  
Table 6 then reports the number of firms in our sample broken down by whether or not 
they are state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This firm characteristic also comes from the Wind Info 
data source.7  SOEs account for about three quarters of these 444 firms, although that proportion 
declines over time due.  
Table 7 compares the values of these variables across the two types of firms. SOEs and 
non-SOEs differ in several aspects. SOEs tend to be much larger than non-SOEs. But they are 
less profitable, and have lower market-to-book ratios. However, both these groups experience 
almost the same degree of change in the market values of their real estate assets during the 
sample period. And, the differences in their fixed assets investment and net loan change are both 
statistically insignificant. 
We also collected data on a number of other firm financial traits. These include 
RATIO_CASH which reflects the net change in cash holdings divided by assets, RATIO_SALARY 
which is defined as total salary payments divided by firm assets, RATIO_DIVIDEND which is 
total dividend payments scaled by firm assets, RATIO_FAINV which is the ratio of net 
                                                 
7The ownership structure is defined according to the dominant controller of the firm (shi ji kong zhi ren) based on 
the official standard used by the China Security Regulatory Commission. More detailed information is available, as 
we can tell whether a SOE is directly controlled by the central government or by some type of sub-national 
government. See Deng, Morck, Wu and Yeung (2014) for more details on the distinction between these two groups. 
Because all our key conclusions are robust to this breakdown, we only report results for all SOEs versus non-SOEs.  
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investment on financial assets such as stocks and bonds to firm asset value, and EMP, which is 
the number of employees per million yuan of firm assets.  
Information also was collected on the total amount of government subsidies received by a 
firm during each year. This also comes from Wind Info which includes this as a sub-entry of 
“non-operating income” in each firm’s income statement. This includes both explicit monetary 
subsidies and implicit subsidies from discounted tax rates. As with the other variables, this also 
is normalized by the total assets of the firm (RATIO_SUBSIDY). It serves as a proxy of 
government support in some of the analysis discussed below.  
Finally, we follow Fan, Wong and Zhang (2007) in collecting information from the 
resumes of each firm’s board members and CEO to proxy for the firm’s political connections 
with government. The dichotomous dummy variable PC equals 1 if the CEO or any board 
member in position at the beginning of the year meets either of the following conditions: he/she 
is or was a government bureaucrat on or above the county level; he/she is or was a parliament 
member (ren da dai biao or zheng xie wei yuan) on or above the prefectural level. 
 
3. Empirical Implementation and Results on Collateral Channel Effects 
Collateral channel effects typically are estimated with a reduced form investment 
specification as given by equation (1), with the underlying model and assumptions from which it 
is derived well described in the on-line theory appendix to Chaney, et. al. (2012).8  
                                                 
8 It is entitled “A Simple Model of Real Estate Prices and Investment” and is available at 
www.princeton.edu/dsraer/theoryRE.pdf.  
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(1) RATIO_INVi,c,t = α + β*RATIO_REVi,t + γ*LPc,t + δt + ηi + φ*OtherControlsi,t + ϵi,t . 
In this equation, i indexes the firms, c denotes the city of their headquarters, and t reflects 
the year of the observation. The variables RATIO_INV and RATIO_REV are as defined above, LP 
is the land price index in the city where the firm is located, δ and η capture year and firm fixed 
effects, respectively, and OtherControls includes standard firm measures of leverage (total 
debt/asset value), firm value (market-to-book value) and cash flow (EBITDA more specifically) 
used in these types of regressions. The investment and collateral value measures are scaled to 
control for firm size differences.9 Time and firm fixed effects are included so that identification 
effectively comes from variation over time within firm. One of the two real estate variables is the 
log of the land price index (LP) in the city where the firm is headquartered. This variable is 
intended to control for broader real estate market changes that could influence investment 
behavior independent of the value of an individual firm’s collateral. 
The coefficient of interest is β which captures how changes in the value of a firm’s real 
estate collateral (RATIO_REV) affect investment (RATIO_INV). Theory does not allow us to sign 
it. Controlling for firm value (which is done via the market-to-book variable discussed above), 
investment and collateral value are negatively correlated for unconstrained firms and positively 
                                                 
9 Note that we use asset value in the denominator rather than the more typical measure in the literature of overall 
property, plant and equipment (which are called “fixed assets” in China). This is due to the nature of the available 
Chinese balance sheet data. As depicted earlier in Table 4, part of a firm’s real estate holdings are not included in the 
item “Fixed Assets” on its balance sheet. In particular, the 2007 adjustment of accounting codes separated the 
leased-out properties from “Fixed Assets”, and put them as part of a new, independent item called “Investment 
Properties” on the balance sheet. This makes the fixed assets series inconsistent over our sample period. Hence, we 
scale by total assets. The 2007 adjustment did not apply to the cash flows, so it does not affect our measure of 
RATIO_INV. 
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correlated for constrained firms.10 Overall, the estimate of β using a panel of firms reflects the 
combination of how many of them are financially constrained, how binding those constraints are, 
and how easy (or necessary) it is to pledge the underlying collateral to increase debt capacity. 
While it is relatively straightforward to generate a specification such as equation (1) from 
a model of investment with financial constraints, it is more challenging to obtain unbiased 
estimates of β. The typical worry is that OLS yields upwardly biased results on the collateral 
channel effect. The productivity of a firm is inherently unobservable, and if it is correlated with 
initial collateral value, the estimate of β will be biased. Reverse causality is perhaps the most 
obvious problem if property prices and productivity are correlated. Consider the case of a firm 
that is large enough in its market to affect factor prices, including local land values. Similar 
effects could occur in markets in which multiple firms from the same industry co-locate. In that 
case, common shifts in investment patterns not actually driven by collateral value could be 
captured in the estimate of β from equation (1) if the firms’ investment behavior bids up local 
land values. Upwardly biased estimates of β also would result if large land-holding firms are 
especially sensitive to local demand shocks (for whatever reason) and our real estate variables 
proxy for local demand to any significant extent (which seems likely).  
                                                 
10 The reasons, which are discussed more fully in the proof of Proposition 1.2 in the on-line theory appendix to 
Chaney, et. al. (2012) referenced above, are as follows. If two unconstrained firms have identical market values, but 
the first has higher collateral value, then it must also have lower productivity and investment than the second firm 
because the greater collateral value raises liquidation value. Thus, productivity and investment are lower in the first 
firm to compensate. Next, consider a completely constrained firm. Its investment is independent of its productivity 
because it is determined by a binding budget constraint set by collateral value (by assumption). However, this 
constrained firm’s productivity must be lower to hold firm value constant, even though this does not affect its 
investment program. Hence, there still is a positive correlation between such value and investment for this type of 
firm, even when firm value is controlled for in the regression. 
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The recent literature on collateral channel effects on U.S. corporate investment exploits 
differences in local market supply elasticity to deal with this bias (Chaney, et. al., 2012; 
Cvijanovic, 2014). The basic strategy is to instrument for real estate values using the interaction 
of a demand shifter (e.g., mortgage rates) with the local supply elasticity, along with city and 
time fixed effects. The underlying logic is as follows. Demand shifters should show up in higher 
prices the more inelastic is local supply. If supply were perfectly elastic, prices should not 
change at all. The measure of supply elasticity used (typically from Saiz, 2010) is based on fixed 
geographic factors such as the amount of water and the slopes of land plots in the market area, so 
it provides plausibly exogenous variation in real estate values due to changes in demand. Using 
this type of instrumental variables estimator, Chaney, et. al. (2012) and Cvijanovic (2014) 
recently report economically large collateral channel effects on investment among U.S. 
corporations. 
A strong instrument does not exist in the Chinese data, so we report OLS estimates of 
equation (1). Given that the most likely case is for β to be biased upward, finding an 
insignificantly small or negative coefficient (without too large a standard error) strongly suggests 
that there is no economically meaningful collateral channel effect in operation. The first three 
columns of Table 8 report our baseline findings. The precise specification estimated is very 
similar to equation (1), except that it also includes interaction terms of the initial firm controls 
with local land prices.11  
                                                 
11This helps control for another source of potential upward bias. As discussed in Chaney, et. al. (2012), upward bias 
in β might also result from potential endogeneity arising from the decision to own real estate in the first place. If 
firms that are more likely to own real estate also are especially sensitive to local demand shocks, equation (1) will 
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The first column reports estimates using the full sample of firms, regardless of type. The 
estimate of β on our measure of the real estate collateral variable, RATIO_REV1, is a very small 
and statistically insignificant 0.0045.12 This average could be masking important heterogeneity 
across types of firms, as state-owned enterprises, which constitute the bulk of our firm sample 
well could be unconstrained. If so, they would not be expected to exhibit any collateral channel 
effect on their investment behavior. Hence, columns 2 and 3 of Table 8 report estimates of the 
same specification on subsamples of SOEs and non-SOEs. The results are not meaningfully 
different, and we cannot reliably discriminate between the coefficients across the two types of 
firms.13 
This conclusion about the absence of a collateral channel effect among listed firms in 
China is robust to many alternative specifications not reported here for space reasons, but 
available upon request. For example, it could be that our desire to minimize upward bias due to 
endogeneity by measuring real estate exposure with the quantity of firm holdings at the end of 
2002 ends up generating attenuation bias in our estimate of β because of measurement error. 
                                                 
overestimate the collateral channel effect. Our inclusion of the firm traits and their interaction with local land prices 
helps control for any fixed firm-level correlation between investment and real estate values. We have no good 
instrument to deal with variation that may not be fixed, but this is not costly for us, as we do not find a meaningful 
collateral channel effect in any event. 
12 The standard error about this estimate is small enough that the upper bound impact presuming a standard 
deviation higher estimate remains economically small. 
13 We also experimented with two instrumental variables. One used the housing supply elasticity estimates from 
Wang, Chan and Xu (2012); the other used a coastal dummy and/or region dummies to instrument for local land 
prices. Both yielded slightly smaller (including barely negative) estimates of β, which is consistent with the 
discussion above the OLS likely yields an upwardly-biased result. However, these results are not statistically 
different from those reported in the first three columns of Table 8. Moreover, the first-stage showed neither to be a 
strong instrument according to standard metrics. That, plus the fact that the one factor we were concerned might bias 
down our estimates proved not to be a problem (see just below in the text for more on that), reinforced our 
preference to report OLS estimates. 
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However, we obtain very similar results if we use RATIO_REV2 instead of RATIO_REV1 as our 
measure of real estate collateral. 
We also investigated whether there were differences in the relationship between firm 
investment behavior and real estate collateral value depending upon whether the property market 
was improving or declining. Results from a specification adding an interaction term of 
RATIO_REV1 with a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the relevant underlying land 
market was declining in value found no evidence of any important asymmetry in impacts on 
investment behavior. Nor did including this added term affect the coefficients on the other right-
hand side regressors in any material way. 
Another robustness check performed arose out of a concern that unobserved firm-level 
default risk could be biasing down our estimate of β. This could occur if the firms with the 
largest real estate holdings were also perceived by lenders as being very risky so that they could 
not borrow to finance additional investment even in the face of rising property values. To 
investigate this, we began by estimating a corporate default risk instrument at the company level 
based on a proportional hazard modeling framework (Deng, 1997; Deng, Quigley and Van 
Order, 2000). We then included the inverse Mills ratio, or the ratio of the probability density 
function to the cumulative distribution function of the corporate default distribution, from that 
corporate default model specification as a proxy to control for unobserved heterogeneity in 
default risk in our investment equation. Adding this corporate default risk factor to our baseline 
model yielded virtually no change in the estimated impact for non-SOEs. That for SOEs did 
increase a bit, but it still remains immaterial in economic and statistical terms. Thus, the absence 
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of a collateral channel effect in China does not appear to be due to some type of specification 
bias arising from an omitted firm trait such as default risk. 
We also investigated whether the small and insignificant estimates of β might be due to a 
lack of investment opportunities for some firms. It is not. First, there is no evidence that 
amassing more real estate at the beginning of the sample period is negatively correlated with 
growth in EBITDA or asset accumulation in general during the following years. We also 
reestimated our baseline model on subsets of firms broken down by whether they were 
headquartered in high, average or low growth cities. These classifications were based on local 
market GDP growth rates computed by the Chinese government. The results for each group were 
statistically and economically indistinguishable from those for the combined sample reported in 
Table 8. It turns out that the average local GDP growth rate in the group of lowest growth 
markets is quite high (at about 11.7% annually), so there are plenty of investment opportunities 
in those places, too. We also estimated the baseline model on subsets of firms based on their own 
asset growth rates. The point estimates for β were larger for both SOEs and non-SOEs among the 
highest third in terms of asset growth, but they were never statistically significantly different 
from zero themselves or from the point estimates for the lowest third of firms in terms of annual 
asset growth. 
Another possible explanation for the absence of any estimated collateral channel effect 
could be that lenders recognize the strong mean reversion in Chinese land price growth 
suggested above in Table 2 and only respond to longer-run, not annual, changes. However, our 
estimates using 2- and 3-year moving averages for both the land price and investment variables 
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never yield a statistically significant positive relationship either. In addition, in cities with 
sufficient land sales each year, we experimented with ARMA models based on their land price 
series and used them to predict the land price change the following year. The results were not 
meaningfully changed by using that imputed land price change to calculate the market value of 
the change in a local firm’s property portfolio. We also experimented using the official housing 
price indicator to calculate the collateral value change. Again, no statistically or economically 
significant collateral channel effect is detected, so this null collateral channel effect is not due to 
the use of our new land price data in lieu of the government series. 
The final three columns of Table 8 provide additional evidence consistent with there 
being no collateral channel effect in China. Those regression results, which substitute the net 
change in firm debt scaled by firm asset value at the beginning of each year as the dependent 
variable, document that there also is no meaningful empirical correlation between changes in 
firm debt and changes in real estate collateral value. The collateral channel works through 
borrowing, so if we saw firm borrowing responding to collateral value even if investment did 
not, the case for no collateral channel effect would not be as strong. These results show no 
correlation with firm debt, not just firm investment. 
 
4. The Nature of Chinese Financial Markets 
That there is no collateral channel effect operating for SOEs is readily explainable in 
terms of their not being financially constrained. Indeed, our findings support the claims by many 
that SOEs are specially favored within the Chinese economy (e.g., see Lin and Tan, 1999; Allen, 
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Qian and Qian, 2005; Poncet, Steingress and Vandenbussche, 2010; Deng, Morck, Wu and 
Yeung, 2014), and have no need to rely on increasing collateral value to secure financing. 
However, that is not credible for non-SOEs which appear to be financially constrained by any 
reasonable metric as suggested by Allen, Qian and Qian (2005) and Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt 
and Maksimovic (2010).  
This raises the question of whether there is something special about the nature of the 
Chinese financial system that can explain the absence of a collateral channel effect even among 
credit constrained firms. The economic theory referenced above tells us that if complete 
contracting is possible, then none of the frictions that lead to a collateral channel effect exist. 
This could result if default were prohibitively expensive. In that case, a borrower could credibly 
commit to repay debt. The question is whether such a situation seems remotely possible in 
China, and then whether one could test for it.  
China is characterized by a single party government which dominates the financial 
system, a judiciary that is not completely independent, and a legal system generally not well 
developed enough to be able to protect well-prescribed borrower rights in the event of default. In 
that situation, a major SOE lender has the potential to impose large costs on defaulting borrowers 
outside of any pledged property collateral, possibly by ‘blackballing’ the borrower with other 
important government-connected lenders or by utilizing other government linkages to have 
sanctions imposed outside of the specific debt contract. 
We do not observe the individual lenders on a given borrower’s projects. However, we 
have collected information on the market shares of the four largest SOE lenders in each province 
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through 2009.14 As noted above, those firms are the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
(ICBC), China Construction Bank (CCB), Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), and Bank of 
China (BOC). We create a measure of the degree of concentration of these top four SOE lenders.  
Table 9 reports results including an interaction term of the share of non-top 4 SOE 
lenders (which equals one minus the share of big 4 SOE lenders) in each market with our 
standard collateral value measure (RATIO_REV1i,t*FMCi,t in the second row of Table 9). Not 
surprisingly, this has no impact on the investment behavior of SOE borrowers (column 2). 
However, this is not the case for non-SOE borrowers, as reported in the third column of Table 9. 
The coefficient from the first row confirms the finding from Table 8 that, on average, there is no 
statistically significant collateral channel effect for this group of constrained firms. However, the 
interaction term reported in the second row is statistically significant and indicates the presence 
of a collateral channel effect in markets where the ‘big 4’ share is smaller. We do not believe 
much meaning can be attached to the magnitude of this coefficient, as it almost certainly is 
biased down because we are using an imperfect (noisy) proxy of the degree to which ‘contract 
completeness’ is relaxed in each market. That we are able to find any evidence of a collateral 
channel effect in these data suggests that non-SOEs are indeed financially constrained, but able 
to credibly commit to repay loans in places where the lender is more likely to be a major state-
owned bank.  
                                                 
14 These data, which were collected from “Yearbook of Finance, China”, are not reported after 2009. 
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The robustness of that conclusion is confirmed by Table 10’s findings. Using data from 
an annual national survey of firm managers conducted by the China Society of Economic 
Reform, a think tank associated with the central government, those specifications use a proxy for 
the ability of the underlying market’s legal system to protect borrower’s rights (Fan, Wang and 
Zhu, 2011). The higher the value of the variable, the greater the degree of legal protection 
according to the managers surveyed, and thus, the less able are borrowers to credibly commit to 
repay lenders. If that hypothesis is correct, this interaction term (RATIO_REV1i,t*LAWi,t) also 
should be significantly positively correlated with investment, indicating the presence of a 
collateral channel effect among constrained non-SOEs in those markets. That is precisely what 
the results in column 3 show, providing further evidence of a collateral channel effect among 
constrained non-SOEs in conditions where the costs of default are not likely to be prohibitively 
high.15 
Tables 9 and 10 provide important new evidence consistent with the absence of frictions 
in credit markets being able to account for why there are no signs of collateral channel effects on 
average in China, but cannot rule out all other potential explanations. Just as our very small 
average collateral channel effect estimate for non-SOEs (column 3 of Table 8) masked important 
variation across markets in degree to which a borrower could credibly commit to repay debt, 
perhaps something similar is occurring with respect to discrimination against certain types of 
                                                 
15 The variation in real estate collateral values imputed from changes in our land price index is critical to finding these 
two statistically significant effects. If we use the variation in the two government-provided housing series to create 
alternative versions of RATIO_REV1, we never find any evidence of heterogeneity in collateral channel effects by the 
degree of ‘big four’ SOE lender concentration or perceived independence of the local legal system.  
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non-SOEs based on their own political connections, whether they are in an industry favored by 
the central government or operating in a city with a binding loan quota set by the central 
government. 
To further investigate these other potential mechanisms, we turn first to the information 
on firm political connections as reflected in whether any board member or CEO of the 444 firms 
in position at the beginning of each year were former government officials or were presently 
serving as a member of parliament. In this case, we interact our measure of political connections 
with our collateral channel variable (RATIO_REV1i,t*PCi,t) and add that term to the baseline 
specification reported in Table 8. The top panel of Table 11 reports the results for the two 
collateral channel effect terms from this specification. Note that neither the average effect nor the 
interaction term is large or statistically significant for non-SOEs (column 3), so we can rule out 
the possibility that our zero collateral channel effect for this group of firms from Table 8 is 
masking important heterogeneity associated with the firm management’s own political 
connectedness. 
The next panel in Table 11 shows that the same conclusion holds with respect to whether 
the firm operates in an industry favored by the government. For this estimation, we use the data 
described above that measures the total amount of subsidies received by the firm (scaled by firm 
asset) and interacted that with our collateral channel measure 
(RATIO_REV1i,t*RATIO_SUBSIDYi,t). Once again, we do not find a statistically significant 
relationship for any group of firms. 
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We also experimented with specifications that included the interaction of the increase in 
the total loan balance (as the proxy of loan quota) for the city in which the firm is headquartered 
with RATIO_REV1. As before, we find no evidence of a collateral channel effect for non-SOEs 
(or for other firms). 
In sum, the only evidence consistent with the existence of any type of collateral channel 
effect is when firms have borrowed in markets not dominated by the four largest state-owned 
lenders or in markets perceived to have the strongest legal protections in China. We do not see 
any such heterogeneity in collateral channel effects associated with variation in the degree of 
firm management’s political connections, in the degree to which the firm is favored by 
government as reflected in its subsidy receipts, or by whether loan quotas have been changed. 
This pattern of results is consistent with the nature of Chinese credit markets being such that the 
typical frictions associated with an inability to credibly commit to repay debt in developed 
markets especially are absent.16  
 
5. Conclusions 
The dramatic growth of Chinese property markets has been critical component of that 
country’s extraordinary economic rise. Because housing markets go down, not just up, it is 
important to ask whether we should expect to see an economically important collateral channel 
                                                 
16 We also investigated differences between SOEs and non-SOEs by changes in wage expenditures (RATIO_SALARY), 
change in holding of cash (RATIO_CASH), investment on financial assets such as stocks and bonds (RATIO_FAINV), 
dividend payment policy (RATIO_DIVIDEND), and employment policy (EMP). There were some modest differences, 
but they are best suited to report in future research on differences between SOEs and purely private firms in China. 
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effect akin to what other research has found for the United States and Japan. Bringing new data 
to bear on this question allows us to provide a first answer. That is ‘no’. An important reason is 
that important Chinese firms such as state-owned enterprises are not financially constrained and 
thus have no need to pledge collateral to fund their desired investment programs. However, we 
do not find meaningful collateral channel effects for constrained private firms. The nature of the 
Chinese financial markets appears to account for this. 
We caution that this does not mean a housing bust would have no seriously deleterious 
consequence for the Chinese economy. There are strong reasons to believe it would (e.g., 
through an employment channel as construction falls and via spillovers to many raw and 
processed materials industries because housing is a large demander of their products), just not 
from a standard collateral channel effect that amplified the investment cycle. 
Finally, our research uses data on listed firms only. Future work should investigate 
whether the findings generalize. At present, it is not possible to replicate our analysis on non-
listed firms. Information on them is completely unaudited and what is available does not include 
data on their real estate holdings. A more likely exception would be among local government-
sponsored enterprises (local SOEs) charged with developing urban infrastructure. These entities 
typically are capitalized with land grants from a local government. That land, which essentially 
serves as the entity’s equity capital, can be used to help raise debt from banks to complete the 
financing of infrastructure. Unfortunately, these entities are not publicly traded, so there is no 
comparable firm-level information available with which to replicate the type of empirical work 
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reported above. It may be possible to aggregate data to the city level, but we leave that 
potentially interesting exercise to future work.  
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Figure 1 
Land Market Dataset Coverage 
  
Note: the cities are labeled by the starting year of the land data in the dataset. 
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Table 1 
Sample Sizes in the Land Transaction Dataset 
 Number of  
Cities Covered 
Number of Land  
Parcels Sold 
2003 15 378  
2004 22 681  
2005 24 773  
2006 33 1133  
2007 34 1413  
2008 35 963  
2009 35 1564  
2010 35 1759  
2011 35 1749 
Aggregated - 10413 
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Table 2 
Annual Real Land Price Appreciation, Summary Statistics, 35 Major Chinese Markets 
 2003-2004 2004-2005 2005-2006 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010 2010-2011 
Mean 32.1% 12.2% 23.5% 46.4% -5.3% 28.5% 31.4% 2.6% 
Standard Deviation 21.7% 23.1% 40.5% 42.1% 24.0% 30.7% 29.4% 30.2% 
Max 64.1% 47.2% 128.8% 131.2% 38.6% 93.1% 83.6% 108.6% 
Median 27.8% 10.0% 20.7% 47.7% 6.6% 29.5% 41.5% 2.7% 
Min 4.4% -28.0% -36.1% -29.2% -59.9% -20.2% -31.6% -44.2% 
Number of Cities 15 22 24 33 34 35 35 35 
Number with Positive Appreciation 15 15 17 28 18 27 29 16 
Number with Negative Appreciation 0 7 7 5 16 8 6 19 
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Table 3 
Compounded Real Annual Appreciation Rates in Constant Quality Land Values, 35 Major Chinese Markets (2009 Yuan) 
 
15 Markets, 2003-2011 
(8 years) 
7 Markets, 2004-2011 
(7 years) 
2 Markets, 2005-2011 
(6 years) 
9 Markets, 2006-2011 
(5 years) 
1 Market, 2007-2011 
(4 years) 
1 Market, 2008-2011 
(3 years) 
Chongqing 27.0% Hefei 30.1% Lanzhou 20.7% Huhehaote 19.7% Yinchuan 8.9% Xining 49.9% 
Shanghai 23.7% Changsha 20.3% Guiyang 12.4% Haikou 17.8%     
Hangzhou 21.8% Tianjin 20.2%   Taiyuan 12.2%     
Nanjing 20.5% Fuzhou 17.7%   Haerbin 10.8%     
Beijing 20.2% Changchun 13.9%   Jinan 7.2%     
Shenzhen 20.1% Shenyang 13.7%   Xian 6.9%     
Xiamen 18.7% Zhengzhou 10.3%   Shijiazhuang 5.1%     
Ningbo 18.5%     Kunming 2.0%     
Chengdu 16.7%     Wulumuqi -2.9%     
Dalian 15.8%           
Guangzhou 14.7%           
Wuhan 13.3%           
Nanning 12.3%           
Nanchang 7.8%           
Qingdao 5.9%           
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Table 4 
Real Estate Asset Information in the Financial Reports 
(A) Before 2006 
 Self-Occupied & Lease-Out Properties 
Self-Built 
Properties 
Construction 
in Progress 
 The lands are listed in the item of “Land Ownerships” as a subentry of “Intangible Assets”. 
 The construction materials, affiliated plants and equipment are listed in the item of “Construction in 
Progress”.  
Completed 
Properties 
 The lands are listed in the item of “Land Ownerships” as a subentry of “Intangible Assets”. 
 The structures are listed in the item of “Buildings” as a subentry of “Fixed Assets”. The plants and 
equipment are excluded. 
Purchased Properties 
 Both lands and structures are listed in the item of “Buildings” as a subentry of “Fixed Assets”. The plants 
and equipment are excluded. 
(B) Since 2007 
 Self-Occupied Properties Lease-Out Properties 
Self-Built 
Properties 
Construction 
in Progress 
 The lands are listed in the item of “Land Ownerships” as a subentry of “Intangible Assets”. 
 The construction materials, affiliated plants and equipment are listed in the item of “Construction in 
Progress”.  
Completed 
Properties 
 The lands are listed in the item of “Land 
Ownerships” as a subentry of “Intangible Assets”. 
 The structures are listed in the item of “Buildings” 
as a subentry of “Fixed Assets”. The plants and 
equipment are excluded. 
 Both lands and buildings are listed in the item of 
“Investment Properties”. The plants and 
equipment are excluded. 
Purchased Properties 
 Both lands and structures are listed in the item of 
“Buildings” as a subentry of “Fixed Assets”. The 
plants and equipment are excluded. 
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Table 5 
Definition and Summary Statistics of Variables 
Variable Definition Average Std. Dev 
ASSET Total assets at the beginning of the year; billion yuan RMB 4.882 17.598 
RATIO_REV1 
Change in the market value of real estate assets held in the 
reference year 2002, normalized by firm assets (see the text 
for more details) 
0.060 0.151 
RATIO_REV2 
Change in the market value of real estate assets held at the 
beginning of each year, normalized by firm assets (see the 
text for more details) 
0.075 0.170 
RATIO_INV 
Net change in investment on fixed assets, normalized by firm 
assets (see the text for more details) 
0.056 0.056 
RATIO_LOAN Net change in loan balance, normalized by firm assets 0.019 0.074 
RATIO_EBITDA 
Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization, normalized by firm assets 
0.089 0.059 
MBR Market-to-book ratio at the beginning of the year. 1.627 1.043 
LEVERAGE Leverage level at the beginning of the year. 0.501 0.159 
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Table 6 
Distribution of Sample by Ownership Structure 
Year Number of SOEs Number of Non-SOEs 
2003 353 91 
2004 347 97 
2005 343 101 
2006 329 115 
2007 323 121 
2008 325 119 
2009 320 114 
2010 318 126 
2011 318 126 
 
 
 
Table 7 
Summary Statistics of Variables by Ownership Structure Groups 
 SOEs Non-SOEs 
t stat. 
 Average Std. Dev Average Std. Dev 
ASSET 5.477 20.089 3.147 5.650 3.655*** 
RATIO_REV1 0.060 0.153 0.060 0.144 0.018 
RATIO_REV2 0.076 0.173 0.075 0.163 0.062 
RATIO_INV 0.057 0.055 0.055 0.057 1.052 
RATIO_LOAN 0.019 0.073 0.021 0.079 1.071 
RATIO_EBITDA 0.086 0.057 0.096 0.065 4.442*** 
MBR 1.552 0.972 1.847 1.201 7.817*** 
LEVERAGE 0.502 0.158 0.499 0.163 0.455 
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 8 
Do Chinese Firms Invest and Borrow More When Collateral Value Increases? 
 Dependent Variable: RATIO_INV  Dependent Variable: RATIO_LOAN  
 Full Sample SOE's Non-SOE's Full Sample SOE's Non-SOE's 
RATIO_REV1i,t 0.0045 0.0062 -0.0003 -0.0000 -0.0052 0.0190 
 (0.0061) (0.0072) (0.0123) (0.0104) (0.0116) (0.0203) 
Log(LPit) -0.0148 -0.0154 0.0217 0.0110 0.0141 0.0451 
 (0.0110) (0.0122) (0.0245) (0.0162) (0.0172) (0.0460) 
MBRi,t 0.0032*** 0.0030** 0.0050** 0.0002 -0.0011 0.0069 
 (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0023) (0.0020) (0.0025) (0.0037)* 
RATIO_EBITDAi,t 0.1743*** 0.1761*** 0.1776*** 0.0329 0.0306 0.0185 
 (0.0186) (0.0237) (0.0375) (0.0299) (0.0376) (0.0571) 
LEVERAGEi,t -0.0624*** -0.0662*** -0.0629*** -0.1467 -0.1497 -0.1733 
 (0.0108) (0.0123) (0.0192) (0.0175)*** (0.0196)*** (0.0356)*** 
Initial Controls * 
Log(LPi,t) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
Observations 
3974 2962 1012 3974 2963 1011 
R2 0.473 0.488 0.499 0.232 0.248 0.284 
Note: (1) the observations are clustered by city-year. 
 (2) standard errors in parentheses. 
 (3) * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 9 
Do Chinese Firms Invest More When Collateral Value Increases in Markets  
Less Dominated by the Four Largest SOE Lenders? 
Dependent Variable: RATIO_INV 
 Full Sample SOE's Non-SOE's 
RATIO_REV1i,t -0.0018 0.0068 -0.0245 
 (0.0121) (0.0167) (0.0216) 
RATIO_REV1i,t* FMCi,t 0.0045 -0.0043 0.0377 
 (0.0078) (0.0115) (0.0169)** 
Log(LPit) -0.0070 -0.0110 0.0725 
 (0.0144) (0.0156) (0.0372)* 
MBRi,t 0.0049 0.0040 0.0072 
 (0.0016)*** (0.0018)** (0.0030)** 
RATIO_EBITDAi,t 0.1764 0.1809 0.1961 
 (0.0225)*** (0.0278)*** (0.0495)*** 
LEVERAGEi,t -0.0884 -0.0885 -0.0908 
 (0.0136)*** (0.0161)*** (0.0262)*** 
Initial Controls * Log(LPi,t) Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 3086 2327 759 
R2 0.511 0.528 0.538 
Note: (1) the observations are clustered by city-year. 
 (2) standard errors in parentheses. 
 (3) * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
(4) Data are for 2003-2009 only. 
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Table 10 
Do Chinese Firms Invest More When Collateral Value Increases in Markets  
with More Transparent Local Legal Systems 
Dependent Variable: RATIO_INV 
 Full Sample SOE's Non-SOE's 
RATIO_REV1i,t 0.0007 0.0076 -0.0202 
 (0.0116) (0.0157) (0.0207) 
RATIO_REV1i,t* LAWi,t 0.0003 -0.0087 0.0392 
 (0.0075) (0.0107) (0.0157)** 
Log(LPit) -0.0078 -0.0120 0.0736 
 (0.0144) (0.0152) (0.0371)** 
MBRi,t 0.0049 0.0040 0.0073 
 (0.0016)*** (0.0018)** (0.0029)** 
RATIO_EBITDAi,t 0.1764 0.1810 0.1987 
 (0.0226)*** (0.0278)*** (0.0496)*** 
LEVERAGEi,t -0.0884 -0.0883 -0.0933 
 (0.0136)*** (0.0161)*** (0.0262)*** 
Initial Controls * Log(LPi,t) Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 3086 2327 759 
R2 0.511 0.528 0.539 
Note: (1) the observations are clustered by city-year. 
 (2) standard errors in parentheses. 
 (3) * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
(4) Data are for 2003-2009 only. 
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Table 11 
Does the Collateral Channel Effect Vary by Degree of Management’s Political Connections 
& Government Favor 
Dependent Variable: RATIO_INV 
A. Heterogeneity by Degree of Political Connection  
 Full Sample SOE’s Non-SOE’s 
RATIO_REV1i,t 0.0091 0.0094 0.0075 
 (0.0064) (0.0073) (0.0143) 
RATIO_REV1i,t* PCi,t -0.0118 -0.0089 -0.0165 
 (0.0099) (0.0115) (0.0171) 
 
B. Heterogeneity by Amount of Government Subsidy 
 Full Sample SOE’s Non-SOE’s 
RATIO_REV1i,t -0.0077 -0.0025 -0.0216 
 (0.0080) (0.0097) (0.0188) 
RATIO_REV1i,t*RATIO_SUBSIDYi,t 0.8347 -0.2140 2.1283 
 (0.9947) (0.9812) (2.2173) 
Note: (1) all models are estimated with additional control variables (see Table 8 for the full specification). 
 (2) the observations are clustered by city-year. 
 (3) standard errors in parentheses. 
 (4) * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
 
